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In this paper I undertake an extended criticism of several aspects
of Thomasson’s (1999) artifactual theory of fictional characters.
Thomasson offers a metaphysical view in which fictional charac-
ters are ‘abstract artifacts’, that is, are abstract entities created by
and depending for their existence on the acts of authors (1999: 7).
Her stated goal in providing such a theory is to show that the
study of fiction is not merely a ‘sideshow’ to the study of meta-
physics, but is in fact centrally important to it (1999: xi). Instead
of ‘starting from a ready-made ontology and seeing how we can
fit fictional characters into it’ (1999: 5), Thomasson wants to ‘be-
gin by paying careful attention to our literary practices so that
we can see what sorts of things would most closely correspond
to them’ (1999: 5).
I focus here on two important features of Thomasson’s theory.
The first is her account of how positing fictional characters as ab-
stract artifacts corresponds to and makes sense of our beliefs and
practices concerning literary fiction. The second is her argument
that the artifactual theory best explains certain linguistic data: the
1 Evan Taylor is an undergraduate student, reading for philosophy at McGill Uni-
versity. He will be graduating in 2013.
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data relating to well-known problems associated with discourse
about fiction, and apparent reference to fictional characters.2
My criticisms are, thus, divided into two main sections. In
the first section, I raise a number of difficulties for Thomasson’s
account of the relationship between literary practices and arti-
factual fictional characters. Firstly, I argue that Thomasson fails
to adequately explain how, on her view, fictional characters are
created by authors. Secondly, I argue that Thomasson’s account
of the metaphysical dependencies that such characters have is
incomplete, and that further considerations about these depen-
dencies raise a number of difficult questions. Thirdly, I argue
that the identity conditions Thomasson outlines for abstract ‘lit-
erary works’ are problematic, and may have unappealing conse-
quences, especially with regard to how we normally think about
the production and consumption of literary fictions. In the sec-
ond section, I evaluate Thomasson’s explanation of the linguis-
tic data from fictional discourse (e.g. apparent reference to fic-
tional characters, negative existentials, literary critical discourse,
etc.). Thomasson is correct that much of the linguistic data are ex-
plained well on her view. However, I argue that, when it comes
to the data that are not so easily accommodated by her theory,
the explanation she offers is unsatisfactory.
None of the criticisms I offer is a knock-down objection, nor
is it my intention to argue that Thomasson’s theory is wholly
false or unfixable. I aim only to highlight certain problems for
the view which either are not apparent to or not addressed by
Thomasson. Specifically, I aim to raise objections which are not
broadly metaphysical in nature, but which are instead founded
in our understanding of literary practices and fictional discourse.
These objections must be dealt with in order for Thomasson’s
view to both make sense of our literary practices as well as ex-
plain fictional discourse.
2 These are merely the two aspects I have chosen to focus on; I do not mean to
imply that Thomasson’s work revolves solely around these claims.
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As Thomasson points out, when it comes to giving an account of
fictional objects, her view has significant advantages over Meinon-
gian theories of non-existent/abstract objects, such as those in
Parsons (1980), Zalta (1983), and Rapaport (1978). Meinongian
views employ what is known as a ‘comprehension principle’,
which states that ‘there is at least one object correlated
with every set of properties’ (Thomasson, 1999: 14). The con-
sequence this principle has for fiction is that authors do not, as
we normally believe, create fictional characters, but instead pick
out some non-existent object that was already there, and then
make it fictional by writing about it (Thomasson, 1999: 16). This
is a strange result, and Thomasson is correct to note that it does
not satisfy the normal view that authors do genuinely engage in
creative activity when they produce fiction (1999: 16). This con-
sequence is avoided on Thomasson’s artifactual view, since she
does not employ any kind of comprehension principle: her view
is not that there is an infinite number of non-existent or abstract
objects which make up a distinct ontological realm, but rather
that fictional characters are similar to more ordinary artifacts, in
that they are created, dependent entities (1999: 15—17). That
her view is not at odds with our ordinary understanding of how
fictional characters are produced is, thus, an advantage Thomas-
son has over the Meinongian.3 Nevertheless, I will argue that
there are still several difficulties for Thomasson’s account when
it comes to our literary practices.
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I have just noted that it is an advantage of the artifactual view
that it does not conflict with our everyday idea that authors en-
gage in creative activity when they write about fictional charac-
ters. However, this view has its own problem when it comes to
3 This is an advantage that Thomasson claims over possibilist theories of fiction,
also.
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the creative activity of authors: it has to explain how these arti-
facts come into existence through authors’ actions. The theorist
who is not in the business of postulating fictional objects has less
of an explanatory burden when it comes to the creative acts of
authors: whatever else she wants to say about literary creativ-
ity, she can maintain that authors do not literally create fictional
characters, in the sense of creating new abstract entities. Alter-
natively, Thomasson does have to explain how, in a very literal
sense, fictional characters are created; how they are brought into
existence (often on the spot) on the basis of certain actions taken
by authors.4 I argue that Thomasson’s account of how authors
create new abstract artifacts is unsatisfactory.
Thomasson acknowledges that it might seem strange to think
that authors can bring fictional characters into existence merely
by writing about them. She notes however, that ‘it has long been
noticed that a common feature of so—called conventional or ef-
fective illocutionary acts such as appointing, resigning, adjourn-
ing, and marrying is that they bring into existence the state of
affairs under discussion’ (1999: 12).5 She also points out that
institutional entities can be brought into existence by being rep-
resented as existing, using Searle’s example, ‘this note is legal
tender for all debts private and public’ (1995: 74). Thomasson as-
serts that there is a parallel between these types of cases and how
fictional characters are created (1999: 13). The idea is that just as
an utterance of ‘I promise to [. . . ]’ or ‘I hereby resign from [. . . ]’,
thereby brings about the state of affairs in which someone has
promised or resigned (respectively), ‘a fictional character is cre-
ated by being represented in a work of literature’ (1999: 13). As
an example, Thomasson uses the first sentence of Jane Austen’s
Emma:
Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, with
a comfortable home and happy disposition, seemed
to unite some of the best blessings of existence, and
had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world with
very little to distress or vex her (1999: 12).
4 I say only ‘often on the spot’ because not all fictional characters are created in a
single act; Thomasson is clear that it may be a long process involving different
authors (1999: 7).
5 Thomasson cites Bach and Harnish (1979) here on effective illocutionary acts.
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This explanation, that there is a parallel between the marriage,
promise, resignation, etc., cases and the case of fictional charac-
ters, is inadequate. Thomasson offers a broad analogy between
these two types of cases as her explanation, but a closer look re-
veals that they are really distinct. It is clear how one can make
a promise simply by uttering, ‘I promise’, and it is clear how
the declaration that a piece of paper is legal tender makes it legal
tender, assuming the declaration is backed up by the relevant au-
thority. In these cases, the content of the sentence uttered in the
linguistic act directly corresponds to the state of affairs which re-
sults from the linguistic act. But is this what is going on with the
case of fictional characters? I do not think it is. Take Thomasson’s
example of the first sentence of Emma: this sentence mentions the
person Emma Woodhouse, and then says some things about her,
but it is not clear that it thereby creates a state of affairs in the real
world in which there is a new abstract artifact. The sentence does
not express a content corresponding to the state of affairs it pur-
portedly brings about. In order for there to be parallel with the
effective illocutionary act cases, authors need to utter sentences
like, ‘I hereby create the fictional character Emma Woodhouse’ or,
‘there is a fictional character called Emma Woodhouse’. Assum-
ing that authors can create such states of affairs through linguistic
acts, it is these utterances, and not ones like the first sentence of
Emma, that would bring such states of affairs about.
That the above sentences are needed in order to for the anal-
ogy to be sound is of course problematic for Thomasson’s ac-
count. Jane Austen cannot utter, ‘there is a fictional character
called Emma Woodhouse’ as part of the literary fiction, because
her creative act itself is not a part of the fiction, and because in
Emma, Emma Woodhouse is a human, not a fictional character.
Since Thomasson cannot explain the creative acts of authors in
terms of these types of sentences, she cannot use the analogy
with effective illocutionary acts, and a separate explanation of
how abstract fictional characters are created is needed.
It might be objected that Thomasson also makes reference to
her ‘intentional object theory of intentionality’ with regards to
the production of fictional characters, and that those considera-
tions can serve as an explanation of authors’ creative abilities. In
particular, Thomasson states that ‘because according to the inten-
tional object theory every intentional act has an object as well
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as a content, if there is no pre-existent object that the thought is
about, a mind-dependent object is generated by that act’ (1999:
88). I do not think, however, that this point serves as any further
explanation; it merely states again that on Thomasson’s view, ab-
stract objects are sometimes created. My objection is not that this
is false, but that the mechanism Thomasson employs in order to
explain how this generation occurs does not work. She asserts
that ‘whether in the case of ordinary performative speech acts,
or creative acts of imagination, an intentional act may bring its
object into existence’ (1999: 90). My point is that Thomasson’s
attempt to explain the latter case in terms of the former (when
the latter case concerns fictional characters) is unsuccessful.
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Thomasson develops a theory of existential dependence which
she uses to explicate the ontological status of both fictional char-
acters as well as abstract ‘literary works’ (1999: 24). She explains
that although fictional characters are dependent on the creative
acts of authors to begin their existence, they can go on existing
after their authors are dead. Thus, fictional characters have what
Thomasson calls a, ‘rigid historical dependence’ on their authors,
but not a, ‘constant dependence’ on them: a given fictional char-
acter is dependent on its specific author to come into existence,
but is not dependent for every given moment of its existence on
that, or any author (1999: 35, 36). Fictional characters, however,
do have a ‘generic constant dependence’ on some literary work
of which they are a part (1999: 36). It is a constant dependence
because if no literary work containing the character exists, nei-
ther does the character, but it is generic because a given fictional
character can appear in several different literary works, and it
does not matter which of these several remains (1999: 36). Liter-
ary works, too, are rigidly historically dependent on the authors
that created them, and they also exhibit two generic constant de-
pendencies: firstly, they are dependent on there being at least
one copy of the literary work, and secondly, they are dependent
on there being a population capable of reading the work (1999:
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36). These, again, are both generic dependencies because there
is no unique copy or population on which they are dependent;
there just needs to be at least one of each for the literary work to
remain in existence.
Thomasson says that dependence on literary works and au-
thors’ creative acts exhausts the immediate dependencies of fic-
tional characters (1999: 36). But, I think this account is incom-
plete. Consideration of the drafting process that literary works
undergo as they are being written shows that fictional characters
also exhibit some dependence on the will of their authors, after
they have been created. I argue that this consideration creates a
puzzle for Thomasson’s account that is difficult to resolve.
Imagine that I write a piece of fiction, and at some point com-
pose the sentence, ‘Mary eventually met four strangers in the
hotel lobby: Frank, Jessica, Susan, and Sarah’. I finish this piece
of fiction and then leave it on my shelf for three years, after which
I come back and revise it. Coming upon the sentence above, I de-
cide four strangers are too many and I revise the sentence to ‘[. . . ]
three strangers in the hotel lobby: Frank, Jessica, and Susan’. As-
suming with Thomasson that when I wrote the above sentence,
I created four new fictional characters, it seems like now I have
just destroyed one. Intuitively, it looks as if Sarah was rigidly
constantly dependent on my wanting to keep her in the story: I
could have taken her out at any given time, and when I eventu-
ally decided to revise the work, Sarah ceased to exist. It might
be thought, alternatively, that it is not that Sarah was dependent
on my will as the author, but that she was only constantly depen-
dent on the literary work, as Thomasson’s theory stipulates. On
this view, when I revised the sentence to remove Sarah, I created
a new literary work, destroying the old one on which Sarah was
dependent. That seems implausible to me. Our regular under-
standing of the way authors produce literary works is that in the
process, they make changes and additions to one and the same
work; they do not produce and destroy hundreds of different
ones. We want to say that I merely took Sarah out of the work
that used to have her in it, not that, by revising that one sentence,
I created a new literary work, and destroyed a different one.
If what I am saying is correct, then during the drafting process,
fictional characters can also exhibit a rigid constant dependence
on the will of their authors: each moment of Sarah’s continued
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existence depended on the fact that I did not revise my work.
Here is the puzzling part: we also want to say that this depen-
dence ends at some point. If I publish my work of fiction, we no
longer want to say that I will be able to revise it, and thus, we no
longer want to say that Sarah is constantly dependent on my will
to keep her in the story. I can wish all I want that I had taken
her out, but at this point it is no longer up to me. The puzzle
is located in the definition of the constant existential dependence
relation: ‘necessarily, whenever X exists, Y exists’ (Thomasson,
1999: 30). What this definition expresses is that every moment of
Y’s existence depends on X’s existence. The definition of constant
dependence does not allow for an object to exhibit it sometimes
and not other times, since by exhibiting it only some of the time,
it thereby fails to exhibit it at all. Saying that a fictional character
can exhibit rigid constant dependence and then stop exhibiting it
forces us to say that it never exhibited that kind of dependence
at all. There is a real sense in which, if at any point in those three
years, I had published the work before removing Sarah, she could
have existed without me. Yet, in the original case in which I do
remove Sarah, there is also a strong drive to say that her whole
existence depended on my will. This is a puzzle that results from
Thomasson’s theory.
I think two different attempts to resolve this puzzle can be
made, but each way has consequences which conflict with our
understanding of literary practices. The first way is to deny the
puzzle outright, to insist that there is nothing really problematic
with saying that during the drafting process, fictional characters
exhibit rigid constant dependence on their authors’ wills, but that
after publication, they cease to exhibit it.6 This response may
be appealing, but it has an unintuitive consequence. What this
line of response suggests is that fictional characters are not iden-
tical to themselves before and after publication. For any given
fictional character, the result is that before publication, it is an
object which exhibits rigid constant dependence on its author’s
will, and after publication it is an object which does not. If this is
6 I assume for ease of explanation that the line at which we want to say this de-
pendence would end is publication, since it is the clearest place to make the
distinction. Other considerations may suggest this line should be drawn slightly
before, or slightly after publication; but those considerations do not affect the
point being made.
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the case, then those are really two different objects and not one.
This conflicts with a basic belief we have about fictions, namely
that the characters contained in them are the same before and
after the fiction is published. The other attempt at resolving the
puzzle is to bite the bullet and accept that fictional characters do
not, after all, exhibit a rigid constant dependence on their authors
will, even during the drafting process. This response is also un-
satisfactory, however: it fails to explain the intuitive scenario in
which the fictional character Sarah was dependent on my will to
keep her in my story, and it seems to deny the obvious ability
of authors to revise their fictions and remove characters as they
please. Thus, with either response, giving a fuller account of the
dependencies of fictional characters leads to unintuitive results
with regard to our regular understanding of literary practices.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
An important aspect of Thomasson’s theory is that a literary work
is not identical with any particular copy of it; it is this property
of literary works that allows them to remain in existence inde-
pendently of any one copy, and thus, allows them to keep the fic-
tional characters within them existent as well. In addition to the
generic constant dependencies outlined for literary works (that
there be some copy of the work and some population capable of
understanding the work), Thomasson states that ‘literary works
are not mere strings of symbols’, and that ‘one and the same
composition can serve as the foundation for two different liter-
ary works in the context of different readerships’ (1999: 65).
On Thomasson’s view, in order for a readership to engage not
just with the words on the page (the composition), but with the
literary work itself, that readership needs to have a certain set
of background assumptions (1999: 65, 66). This is because lit-
erary works have particular origins; they are essentially tied to
a particular place in social, political and literary history (1999:
8). Thomasson illustrates this idea with the example of Animal
Farm: ‘the same sequence of words appearing in Animal Farm
could have been written in 1905, but that literary work could
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not have had the property of being a satire of a Stalinist state, a
central property of Orwell’s tale’ (1999: 8).
This aspect of Thomasson’s theory also has problematic conse-
quences; I again offer a hypothetical example to illustrate them.
Imagine that a future civilisation finds a book on an archeological
dig which they correctly believe to be a piece of fiction. However,
they lack the historical knowledge necessary to determine the
political, social, and literary context in which this book is writ-
ten. Nevertheless, they can read and understand the sequence
of words contained in the book, and subsequent literary critical
discourse develops out of their engagement with this archeolog-
ical find. For clarity’s sake, let us assume the book they find
is Animal Farm, and for whatever reason, this civilisation knows
nothing about twentieth century history or Stalinist regimes. We
can also assume that there is no other population who still has
kept Animal Farm, as we know it, in existence. When they read
the book, are they engaging with Animal Farm as a literary work?
I argue that, based on Thomasson’s identity conditions for lit-
erary works, we are forced to say that they are not, which has
problematic consequences for the view. Thomasson maintains
that ‘being a satire seems essential to Animal Farm considered as
a work of literature’ (1999: 9). This fact alone excludes our fu-
ture civilisation from engaging with Animal Farm properly. On
top of that, the theory of dependence outlined for literary works
suggest that Animal Farm no longer exists (since there is no popu-
lation with the correct background assumptions to understand it),
and if it does not exist then our future civilisation cannot engage
with it. We cannot say that our future civilisation has revived
Animal Farm either, for the same reason they are not reading it in
the first place: they are ignorant of the historical circumstances
in which Animal Farm was created.
It looks like we are forced to say that this future civilisation is
not engaging with the literary work Animal Farm, but instead has
a new literary work on their hands based on the same sequence
of words. This conclusion has two troubling consequences. The
first is that, if there is a new literary work, then it must have been
created. Unlike the easy cases in which we can identify a literary
work with particular creative acts of a single author, in this case
we have several different people, and all they have done is read a
book. Figuring out the dependencies this new literary work will
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exhibit may be impossible. It may even be the case that there
are multiple new literary works and not just one, assuming that
a number of different people carry different enough background
assumptions. It also conflicts with our understanding of literary
practices to say that a literary work can be created by being read;
if something is being read, then we want to say that a literary
work already exists.
The second problematic consequence derives from the fact that
it is the future civilization’s ignorance of Stalinism that prevents
them from engaging with or reviving the literary work Animal
Farm. We said that they cannot be engaging with Animal Farm
because they fail to realise that it is a satire, and thus, we were
forced to say that they have somehow created a new literary work.
Though somewhat more elaborate, this case is not drastically dif-
ferent from the more mundane scenario in which a person simply
reads Animal Farm but fails to understand it properly. Let us say,
perhaps, that Billy, nine years old, reads it and interprets it as a
story about animals on a farm. This case is different in details,
but not substance, from our future civilisation case. It looks like
we have to say that Billy, also, has created a new literary work,
since by definition he is not reading Animal Farm. This is highly
unintuitive; we do not want to say that Billy has read something
new, we want to say that he has read Animal Farm, but failed
to understand it. The stark division that Thomasson makes be-
tween a sequence of words and the literary work produced by
those words, though plausibly in many ways, is responsible for
these unintuitive consequences.
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Thomasson maintains that one of the benefits of her theory is that
it neatly accounts for certain linguistic data that other theories
have difficulty with. She points out that a great deal of work has
been done on analysing fictional discourse, most of it in an effort
to explain how our ways of speaking seem to commit us to fic-
tional characters, and to avoid postulating such characters (1999:
93). Thomasson thinks that this approach is mistaken, and that
fictional discourse is better accounted for if we admit fictional
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characters into our ontology. I agree that Thomasson’s view han-
dles much of the linguistic data from fictional discourse well, but
argue that with respect to one piece of data her explanation is
lacking.
The problems surrounding fictional discourse are well known;
our talk about fiction seems to commit us to the existence of fic-
tional characters, since we use names like, ‘Holmes’ and, ‘Hamlet’
which seem to refer to them. As Thomasson notes,
[. . . ] philosophers of language dealing with fiction
have often taken their task to be that of providing
analyses of statements apparently about fictional ob-
jects that, despite the nonreference of fictional terms,
yield truth-values that accord with our ordinary be-
liefs about which statements are true, and which false
(1999: 94).
Thomasson acknowledges that non-postulating views, such as
Russellian and Fregean analyses, are capable of adequately ac-
counting for certain, but not all, of the data (1999: 95). The data
they can account for are the simplest cases which seem to com-
mit us to fictional characters: sentences like ‘Hamlet is a prince’.
The Fregean analysis, for example, treats this sentence as lacking
truth-value, since it insists that the name ‘Hamlet’ does not refer
to anything. This relieves us of the ontological commitment to
fictional characters, but does not accommodate our judgement
that the sentence is true. The most common way to make such
an accommodation is to paraphrase the sentence as, ‘according
to the story, Hamlet is a prince’ (Thomasson, 1999: 94, 95).
However, non-postulating views have a much more difficult
time accounting for sentences which are not about the content
of fictions, but are ‘real-world’ assertions of critical literary dis-
course. Sentences of this category are those like, ‘Hamlet is
a fictional character’, and ‘Hamlet was created by Shakespeare’
(Thomasson, 1999: 95).
Thomasson’s main criticism of non-postulating views is that in
order to account for sentences like these, they have to develop
more implausible ad hoc paraphrases which do not contribute to
a general account of fictional discourse; all for the goal of avoid-
ing postulating fictional characters (1999: 95, 99). Thomasson’s
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view, alternatively, handles the real-world assertions well. She
analyses, for example, ‘Hamlet was created by Shakespeare’ as
straightforwardly true: the name Hamlet refers to a fictional char-
acter which was indeed created by Shakespeare. No paraphrase
is needed and the intuitively correct truth value is derived; this
simple explanation of these types of sentences is certainly an ad-
vantage of Thomasson’s account.7
Yet, as Thomasson acknowledges, her theory does encounter
problems with certain data, most notably with negative existen-
tials, as well as with the simple ‘Hamlet is a prince’ case. The
first problem is that, on Thomasson’s view, negative existential
statements seem to come out false, even though we intuitively
think there is a sense in which they are true. We usually think
‘Hamlet does not exist’ expresses a truth, since Hamlet is a fic-
tional character from a play. Since Thomasson postulates the ex-
istence of fictional characters, however, that sentence looks false
on her view. The second problem is with cases like ‘Hamlet
is a prince’. On Thomasson’s view, ‘Hamlet’ refers to the fic-
tional character created by Shakespeare; fictional characters are
abstract artifacts, and an abstract artifact cannot have the prop-
erty of being a prince. Thus, this sentence also comes out false,
even though it is intuitively true.
Thomasson’s resolution to these difficulties is to offer para-
phrases of these two types of sentences. She acknowledges that
fictional discourse comes with ‘confusions and inconsistencies
that need to be sorted out’, and that every theory will have to
make some trade-offs (1999: 111). She is careful to point out
in criticising non-postulating views that it is not the paraphrase
technique itself that she objects to, just the ad hoc overuses of it
(1999: 96). Thus, Thomasson argues that the negative existential
cases, like ‘Hamlet does not exist’, can be paraphrased to express
truths. Thomasson suggests we interpret this sentence as saying
‘there is no (real) person who is Hamlet’ (1999: 112). Further,
Thomasson thinks that all statements made in what she calls the
‘fictional context’ (the context in which what is being discussed
is what is true in the fiction) can usefully be prefixed with: ‘ac-
cording to the story’. But, because we implicitly understand if
7 Thomasson also points out that her theory has advantages over Walton’s (1990)
‘pretense’ view, as well as the other postulating, Meinongian views (1999: 96, 97,
100—105).
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we are in the fictional context or not, actually doing so is usually
unnecessary (1999: 105). Since the sentence ‘Hamlet is a prince’
is uttered in the fictional context, it can be prefixed in this way,
and understood to express a truth (1999: 113).
I think Thomasson’s resolution of the negative existential case
is more or less unproblematic. Thomasson is right to point out
that her paraphrase is usually what people have in mind by ut-
tering this sentence; they want to deny that there is such a person
Hamlet in the real world, but have no intention of denying (un-
less influenced by philosophy) that there is a fictional character
Hamlet (1999: 113). However, I think Thomasson’s resolution of
the ‘Hamlet is a prince’ case is not as straightforward or satisfac-
tory as she takes it to be. The ‘according to the story’ prefix does
not alone resolve the problem.
Considerations found in Currie (1990) help to make the issue
for Thomasson clear. Currie distinguishes between three differ-
ent uses of fictional names and offers a different account for each
one. His three-way distinction is between what he calls, ‘fictive’
uses, ‘metafictive’ uses and, ‘transfictive’ uses (1990: 180, 181).
The metafictive use, and the transfictive use, more or less corre-
spond to Thomasson’s fictional context and real context, respec-
tively; in addition, Currie offers similar explanations to Thomas-
son’s.8 Currie’s ‘fictive’ use of fictional names is the use em-
ployed in the actual text of a given fiction. If I utter, for example,
‘Holmes smokes a pipe’, then that is a metafictive use, but if Co-
nan Doyle utters it in writing the fiction, then it is a fictive use
(1990: 146, 147).
I contend that the problem with Thomasson’s explanation of
the ‘Hamlet is a prince’ datum is derived from her failure to
make a distinction along the lines of Currie’s ‘fictive’ use. For
Thomasson, the name ‘Hamlet’ refers to the fictional character,
that is, the abstract artifact ‘Hamlet’, both inside and outside the
content of the fiction (1999: 107). This fact is suggested by re-
marks Thomasson makes regarding naming ceremonies for fic-
tional characters; she states that the first uses of the names of
characters in their texts are naming baptisms of the fictional ob-
8 The explanations are similar in that for the metafictive use, Currie employs an
‘according to the story’ operator, and for the transfictive use, Currie makes use
of what he calls ‘roles’, which are theoretical entities that have much in common
with Thomasson’s abstract artifacts (Currie, 1990: 159, 172—174).
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jects themselves (1999: 47).9 Thus, if the name ‘Hamlet’ refers
to a fictional object whenever it is used, then the ‘according to
the story’ paraphrase does not help to make ‘Hamlet is a prince’
true. So paraphrased, the sentence ‘Hamlet is a prince’ ends up
expressing the proposition that according to the story, the fic-
tional object Hamlet is a prince. This sentence is false, because
the story says nothing about any fictional object Hamlet; accord-
ing to the story, Hamlet refers to a man, not a fictional object.
What Thomasson needs in order to resolve this difficulty is to
make a distinction along the lines of Currie’s fictive and metafic-
tive uses.10 When it comes to ‘Hamlet is a prince’, it is not an
‘according to the story’ paraphrase that Thomasson needs, it is
an ambiguity between ‘Hamlet’ as it is used to refer in the story,
and ‘Hamlet’ as it is used to refer when talking about the fictional
character. ‘Hamlet is a prince’ needs to be interpreted as ‘Hamlet-
in-the-story is a prince’, and ‘Hamlet was created by Shakespeare’
needs to be interpreted as ‘Hamlet-fictional-object was created
by Shakespeare’. Without this ambiguity, we end up asserting,
through the bare paraphrase alone, that the story Hamlet makes
claims about certain abstract fictional objects, which it does not.
Is such an ambiguity plausible? It seems like on Thomasson’s
view, it is required, in order to reliably distinguish between what
is true in the story, and what is true of certain fictional objects in
the real world. I only want to bring up one worry, and that has to
do with naming ceremonies. As I mentioned above, Thomasson
takes fictional objects to be baptised with their names within the
story in which they appear. Yet, if we are going to need an ambi-
guity between, for example, ‘Hamlet-in-the-story’ and, ‘Hamlet-
fictional-object’, we are going to need a naming ceremony for the
referent of ‘Hamlet-in-the-story’. The most obvious candidate is
the first use of the name in the fiction, but this, on Thomasson’s
account, is already the naming ceremony for the fictional object
(1999: 48). Whether the initial use of a name in a piece of fiction
can serve both as a naming ceremony for an abstract artifact in
our world, as well as a person in the fiction, is not entirely clear.
9 This interpretation of Thomasson’s understanding of the reference of fictional
names is reinforced in Braun (2005: 610).
10 I am not suggesting that Thomasson needs to adopt any of the analyses that
Currie offers, only that uses of the name within the story and uses of the name
outside of it are distinguished between.
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I have argued that Thomason’s (1999) artifactual theory of fic-
tional characters is problematic on several accounts. In the first
section, I raised difficulties for the theory with regard to its ac-
commodation of our understanding of ordinary literary practices.
I argued that Thomasson gives an inadequate explanation of how
fictional characters are created, and that the theories of depen-
dence for fictional characters and identity conditions for literary
works have unintuitive consequences that need to be resolved. In
the second section, I argued that, although Thomasson’s theory
can explain much of the linguistic data from fictional discourse,
her explanation of the ‘Hamlet is a prince’ case is unsatisfactory.
My goal has been to point out these apparent difficulties and
clarify the problems Thomasson’s account faces. In order for the
artifactual theory of fictional characters to both make sense of our
literary practices as well as fictional discourse, the issues I have
raised in this paper must be addressed.
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